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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we discuss near-term prospective nuclear
energy cooperation measures, related to the back end of
the nuclear fuel cycle that may be implemented by the U.S.
and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as part of a comprehen-
sive program of long-term nuclear cooperation. These
suggestions represent a perspective on near-term measures
the ROK might consider to enhance its nuclear cooperation
with the U.S.  Korean experts may have a parallel sugges-
tions; an exchange of opinions may eventually lead to
mutually acceptable and practical cooperation. Importantly,
none of these propositions prejudice the results of the exten-
sion of the agreement for nuclear cooperation between
the U.S. and the ROK (the 123 Agreement) (1). Some of
these proposals may be implemented independently of
these discussions, and may enhance the prospects for a
successful conclusion of the negotiations. We then suggest
a joint long-term nuclear energy development program
that will require changes to the current 123 Agreement.
These changes are not imminent and may be worked into
the extension Agreement as step-wise conditional modifi-
cations reflecting future trends in nuclear cooperation.
2. THE SPENT FUEL STORAGE PROBLEM IN ROK
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
There are currently twenty-three operating nuclear
reactors in the ROK, located at four sites. These reactors,
at 20.7 GWe total generating capacity, provide 35% of
the ROK’s electricity supply. The ROK’s goal is to have
40 reactors in operation by 2030, providing 59% of total
generation. Four of the operating reactors are 700 MWe
class Canadian type CANDU natural uranium heavy water
reactors, the rest are mostly 1,000 MWe pressurized water
reactors (PWRs) fueled with low enriched uranium oxide
(LEU). A summary of the nuclear energy system of the
ROK is shown in Figure 1 below (2). 
In this paper we discuss spent fuel management options in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from two interrelated
perspectives: Centralized dry cask storage and spent fuel pyroprocessing and burning in sodium fast reactors (SFRs). We
argue that the ROK will run out of space for at-reactors spent fuel storage by about the year 2030 and will thus need to
transition centralized dry cask storage. Pyroprocessing plant capacity, even if approved and successfully licensed and
constructed by that time, will not suffice to handle all the spent fuel discharged annually. Hence centralized dry cask storage
will be required even if the pyroprocessing option is successfully developed by 2030. 
Pyroprocessing is but an enabling technology on the path leading to fissile material recycling and burning in future SFRs.
In this regard we discuss two SFR options under development in the U.S.: the Super Prism and the Travelling Wave Reactor
(TWR). We note that the U.S. is further along in reactor development than the ROK. The ROK though has acquired more
experience, recently in investigating fuel recycling options for SFRs. We thus call for two complementary joint R&D project
to be conducted by U.S. and ROK scientists. One leading to the development of a demonstration centralized away-from-
reactors spent fuel storage facility. The other involve further R&D on a combined SFR-fuel cycle complex based on the
reactor and fuel cycle options discussed in the paper.
KEYWORDS : ROK - U.S. Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement), Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) Rights, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)
Management, Dry Cask Storage, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), Pyroprocessing, Korea Advanced Pyroprocessing Facility
(KAPF), Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR), Super-Prism, Travelling Wave Reactor (TWR) 
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Currently, all spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from operating
ROK nuclear power plants (NPPs) are stored on plant sites,
mostly in the SNF pools attached to each reactor. This
practice is referred to as on-site wet storage. It is expected
that the SNF storage pools in these NPPs will be full (satu-
rated) within the decade. The ROK may arrange for several
additional years of pool storage via various mechanisms.
For example, they may upgrade to high density racking of
all SNF pools; ship SNF from saturated pools, to relatively
empty SNF pools located on the same site; and they might
transport SNF by ship between NPP sites. Fuel transship-
ment between NPP sites, each located in a different province
of the ROK, requires logistical planning, regulatory ap-
proval, and consent of both province authorities – a non-
trivial bureaucratic hurdle. These temporary measures will
eventually run their course, SNF pools will approach satura-
tion, and the fundamental problem of SNF disposition will
remain. 
To demonstrate the saturation delay achieved using
these enhanced on-site SNF wet storage techniques, we
plot the space available in the SNF pools of two different
scenarios or 'systems' at the Kori site in Figure 2. In the
first scenario we allow transshipment of SNF between only
the four oldest reactors, Kori 1-4; in the second scenario,
we allow transshipment of fuel between six reactors, Kori
1-4 and the new Shin-Kori 1-2 (as they come online in 2011
and 2012 respectively). We assume historically reasonable
fuel burnup, capacity factors and power levels as well as
the best available information about pool capacity and
inventory status. In the first scenario when transshipment
is allowed only between the four reactors, the fuel pools
saturate in 2018. In the second scenario, taking advantage
of the two new fuel pools upon commissioning of Shin-Kori
1-2, pool saturation is reached in 2024. While immediate
saturation is only mitigated by this scheme, it does serve
to delay the problem by six years at the Kori site. If addi-
tional new units are commissioned at Kori, more pool space
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Fig. 1. Current Nuclear Power Plants in the ROK and Near-term Construction Plans (3)
Fig. 2. Space Remaining for SNF Storage in Reactor Fuel
Pools of Two Systems with Shipment of SNF between the
Reactor Pools in Those Systems. Zero Crossing Represents
Saturation of Fuel Pools and Negative Values Represent
Excess Fuel. By Taking Advantage of the Space Made
Available by Two New Reactors (Shin Kori 1-2) we Delay
Saturation at the Kori Site by 6 Years.
Fig. 3. Saturation of Spent Fuel Storage Pools Assuming Inter-
Site Transshipments
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will become available and more time may be gained by
this scheme. However, in a short time those pools will
also fill up.
In general, utilities prefer leaving empty space in SNF
pools rather than filling them to capacity with high density
racking. Seismic stability and radiation minimization con-
siderations from high-density storage dictate avoiding satu-
ration. For operators, there is a balance between economics
and operational flexibility. Given these considerations, it
is not clear the ROK operators will support saturation of
pools, and other solutions may be preferred. Our analysis,
applied to all current NPP sites and considering spent fuel
movement intra- and inter-site, indicates that even with
free fuel movement throughout the country, the ROK will
run out of wet storage space in all reactor SNF pools before
2030. This can be seen in Figure 3 for the ROK nuclear
energy system as a whole, and considering specific sites
in Figure 4.
Similar results to those shown in Figures 3 and 4 were
independently developed by others (4). While exact numer-
ical figures might vary based on technical assumptions,
initial conditions and information available, the qualitative
message is clear: the ROK will run out of wet SNF storage
space in the next decade, and complementary options will
be required. 
An additional option for handling excess SNF is con-
struction of dry cask storage facilities on-site, and transport
of SNF from wet storage pools to these dry storage facilities.
However, not all NPP stations have adequate land on which
such facilities may be constructed. Also, the local population
may object to such facilities, particularly if located close
to communities. Resistance to on-site dry storage will be
stronger if such facilities are perceived as permanent should
no national nuclear waste repository program be developed.
Nevertheless, on-site dry-cask storage facilities were li-
censed in the ROK for the NPP sites of Wolsong and Hanul
(formerly Ulchin), and a limited dry storage program has
been implemented in Wolsung. This facility handles low
burnup CANDU fuel with lower radioactivity than higher
burnup PWR spent fuel. Moreover, the smaller length of
the CANDU assembly makes it easier to handle and store
within a tall concrete silo. No PWR spent fuel assembles
are currently stored in dry cask containers at ROK NPP
sites. A schematic view of on-site wet and dry storage
options is shown in Figure 5.
A typical 1,000 MWe PWR operating at about 90
percent capacity factor with a burnup level of 50,000 MWth-
Day/MT will discharge about 20 MT of SNF per year. The
40 reactors planed by the year 2030 will annually discharge
more than 1,000 MT of spent PWR and CANDU fuel.
Given the above factors combined with the storage capacity
of SNF pools, the current four sites along with an additional
site to be opened by 2030 will be unable to contain all SNF
accumulated by that point. 
An alternative would be construction of a centralized
away-from-reactors dry-cask storage facility in the ROK
and transportation of SNF from NPP sites to this facility.
Such centralized facility is referred to generically as an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A
general discussion of the centralized dry cask storage option
is provided in (5). Given that all ROK NPPs are located
near the ocean, if overland transportation proved infeasible,
SNF could be transported from NPP sites by ship (assuming
such a storage facility were also located close to shore).
For reasons mentioned above, public opposition might also
plague a large national facility. While a low level waste
facility was approved by the community and constructed
at Kyongju /Gyeonju on the East coast, 370 km from Seoul
(6), no similar site for centralized SNF or high level waste
has been approved. The ROK recently announced plans for
a dry cask centralized facility to be licensed and constructedFig. 4. Site-Specific Spent Fuel Pools Fill Scenarios
Fig. 5.  A View of Large-Scale On-Site Wet (Left) and Dry (Right) Spent Fuel Storage Options
by about 2020 (7). While there is no doubt as to the ROK's
ability to design and construct this facility, no site has been
selected, named or licensed. Furthermore, the ROK has no
experience in constructing such a facility for high burnup
PWR SNF. 
3. POTENTIAL ROK – U.S. COLLABORATION ON
DRY-CASK SPENT FUEL STORAGE
The ROK will likely have to implement a centralized
dry-cask storage program within the next decade, even with
successful development of alternatives such as pyropro-
cessing (discussed later). It is logical then to take advantage
of this unavoidable requirement.
With U.S. technical, licensing and operating experience
support, the ROK could implement within the next ten years
or so a centralized dry cask SNF storage demonstration
program. In the subsequent decade this could lead to the
construction of a large centralized ISFSI. The demonstration
program we propose is limited to one small concrete pad
on which approximately ten dry cask concrete storage silos
would be constructed containing well-packaged SNF ele-
ments. The facility would be instrumented and monitored
to analyze performance over time. The small dimensions
of such a facility allow for it to be located in any remote
area. Public opposition could be ameliorated by siting such
a facility on a larger military reservation. The facility could
be developed and constructed with U.S. help since the U.S.
has accumulated significant experience in the design, licens-
ing, construction and operation of such facilities for high
burnup PWR fuel. The U.S. can contribute technical and
operational data to such a program without jeopardizing
the ROK’s long-term interest in pyroprocessing. 
There are several advantages in developing a joint
centralized storage program with U.S. collaboration: 
First, the U.S. has significant experience with dry cask
storage facilities. Although all U.S. dry cask storage facili-
ties are located at NPP sites, such facilities are of the size
of the ROK demonstration facility we recommend, so U.S.
experience is highly relevant to a ROK program.
Second, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is interested in dry cask storage issues for U.S. NPPs
in the post-Fukushima regulatory environment. This is
based on the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Com-
mission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) The NRC is
developing additional research and regulatory frameworks
for dry cask storage (8) in which the ROK may be interested.
A joint demonstration program will improve the regulatory
and technical bases for an ROK program and would support
the U.S. program as well.
Third, the ROK has embarked on a program to export
reactor technology worldwide. The attractiveness of its
commercial offerings would be enhanced if it were to offer
a package of fuel cycle services, including dry cask storage,
to the client country. To do this, the ROK must demonstrate
it has mastered the technology in its own nuclear energy
program. Collaboration with the U.S. will support develop-
ing such credentials. A successful ROK reactor and services
export program with U.S. participation would benefit both
parties. 
Fourth, developing a joint dry cask storage program
with the U.S. will have a positive impact on ROK-U.S.
discussions on the extension of the 123 Agreement. The
ROK's SNF policy is criticized because it is claimed to be
pursuing pyroprocessing to the exclusion of other options
such as interim storage. The ROK might strengthen its
negotiating position if it were to present a more compre-
hensive and balanced program including a centralized
dry cask storage component.
Just as the ROK and the U.S. have developed a joint
pyroprocessing research program, it is to their mutual
benefit to develop a parallel joint demonstration program
for centralized dry cask SNF storage.  Both the ROK and
the U.S. could capitalize on the results of the BRC work
which were recently embraced by Dr. Ernest J. Moniz the
incoming U.S. Secretary of Energy as a basis for parallel
and joint programs on spent fuel storage. 
4. PYROPROCESSING AS A SNF MANAGEMENT
OPTION
Reprocessing and refabricating fuel is another option
to aid in SNF disposition. It entails recycling useful content
of SNF back into operating NPPs and sending remaining
high-level waste to a repository. A schematic depiction
of a specific type of reprocessing, pyroprocessing and its
role within a nuclear energy system is shown in Figure 6.
Reprocessing, specifically pyroprocessing in the ROK,
is not a waste management solution in itself. Rather, it is
an enabling technology. It is a step in producing a type of
fuel – a metallic mix of uranium and plutonium in a zirco-
nium matrix that can be burned in sodium fast reactors
(SFRs), more generally fast breeder reactors (FBRs).
Pyroprocessing requires an additional fabrication step for
the fuel, increasing the cost of the technology compared
to the current once-through fuel cycle. Without a concurrent
remote fuel re-fabrication and breeder reactor, pyropro-
cessing in itself will only partially ameliorate the SNF
problem. In fact, pyroprocessed fuel alone will increase
proliferation concerns: it will make the plutonium in SNF
more accessible to proliferators, particularly in its metallic
form, without the self-protection of the gamma radiation
in the original SNF. Furthermore, fuel from pyroprocessing
(U+Pu+Zr metallic fuel mix) is not suitable for recycling
in PWRs as is the product of traditional (wet chemistry
PUREX) reprocessing. Without concurrent availability of
a fuel re-fabrication plant and a breeder reactor, pyropro-
cessing in itself is not an adequate solution to the SNF
disposition problem. 
A pyroprocessing plant is currently unavailable to the
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ROK since enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) of nuclear
fuel are prohibited under the current U.S. – ROK 123 Agree-
ment. The ROK is trying to free itself from this restriction
in the upcoming revision of the Agreement based on two
main technical arguments. First, reprocessing is necessary
to reduce the volume of waste to be sent to the final reposi-
tory and it mitigates the need to construct a large final
repository. Second, reprocessing is required to recover
fissile content of SNF and recycle it in fast breeder reactors.
As mentioned above, fuel recycling in SFRs could guarantee
long-term viability of nuclear energy, without dependence
on imported uranium and enrichment services (10). The
ROK is engaged in research and development of pyropro-
cessing. Indeed, the ROK and U.S. Governments have
started a ten year review program of pyroprocessing to
determine its technical and commercial feasibility (11).
The final report is due by 2020.  Basic research in pyropro-
cessing is now carried out in the PRIDE facility in the
KAERI research center in Daejeon (shown in Figure 7
below). Both authors visited the PRIDE facility in January
2013 and were impressed with the significant amount of
progress in the facility since its inception less than two
years ago. 
After the completion of the joint pyroprocessing study
in 2020, the ROK plans proceed to the design, licensing
and construction of a commercial demonstration plant with
a capacity of 100 MT/Year, referred to as the Korea Ad-
vanced Pyroprocessing Facility (KAPF) (12), assuming that
all the requisite approvals are obtained within the general
framework of the 123 Agreement for Cooperation with the
U.S. Formal plans call for commercial operation of the
KAPF by 2028, just eight years after completing the joint
studies with the U.S. conditional on U.S. acceptance men-
tioned above. In parallel, the ROK is planning a fuel re-
fabrication effort and a 150 MWe Sodium Fast Reactor
(SFR) by 2028. This plan is shown schematically in Figure 8.
Basing SNF disposal policy solely on concurrently
commercializing pyroprocessing technology (and related
fuel re-fabrication and fast reactor systems) before 2030
is fraught with uncertainty. First, it is not clear that pyropro-
cessing will live up to its technical and economic expecta-
tions. Furthermore, the combined costs of pyroprocessing
and remote metallic fuel re-fabrication might exceed the
costs of nuclear fuel supply at the front-end of the current
PWR fuel cycle. Second, even if suitable, it would take at
least ten additional years to develop, demonstrate, design
and construct commercial-scale pyroprocessing plants be-
yond the projected completion of the KAPF demonstration
facility by 2028. We expect this process to extend towards
2040 or so, if all the technical and economic issues are
solved and all the requisite bi-national approvals are ob-
tained. Thus large scale pyroprocessing of SNF that could
seriously mitigate the PWR’s SNF accumulation will likely
happen sometime post-2040. Third, Even if pyroprocessing
and fuel re-fabrication technologies could be commercialized
within the timeframe claimed, it is likely the commercial-
ization of fast breeder reactors would require longer than
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Fig. 6.  Pyroprocessing within a Closed Fuel Cycle (9)
Fig. 7.  The PRIDE Experimental Pyroprocessing Facility in
Daejeon.
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currently assumed. This is borne out by the experience of
other countries – France, Japan, India, and China, where
SFRs commercialization is a long, drawn-out process, ex-
tending beyond original estimations. While an SFR demon-
stration reactor might be constructed by 2030, we are hesi-
tant to estimate when a larger 150 MWe SFR may become
operational. Currently there is no SFR facility in the ROK.
Leaping to a 150 MWe operating reactor in fifteen years
might prove difficult. While it is possible that a small py-
roprocessing and re-fabrication plant might operate in the
ROK around 2030, the fuel from such facilities would have
to be stored under stringent safeguards for some time until
a commercial SFR is operational. We address SFR develop-
ment issues in the next section of this paper, where we
consider that full maturation of commercial-sized SFR in
the ROK is even more daunting than commercializing the
pyroprocessing technology. 
As discussed above, there is a mismatch between SNF
discharged from operating PWRs during the 2030’s and
the capacity of the pyroprocessing plant. By 2030, we
estimate more than 1000 MT of SNF will be discharged
annually from ROK NPPs and SNF pool storage will be
saturated by 2029. We also assume that the KAPF will
start commercial operation in the 2030’s. However, its
capacity will be only 100 MT/year – a tenth of the annual
SNF discharged. Most of the SNF will have to be stored
until a larger commercial-sized pyroprocessing plant is
constructed – probably sometime around 2040. To store
excess SNF, on-site dry cask storage might become availa-
ble on some nuclear sites, though likely not enough to to-
tally solve the problem. Therefore, a centralized dry cask
storage facility – an ISFSI – will have to be implemented
regardless of the success of the pyroprocessing program. As
mentioned, we assume a commercial-sized pyroprocessing
plant could be ready in about thirty years time. Pyropro-
cessing is a thirty year solution to a ten year problem.
To reiterate, even if a commercial-sized pyroprocessing
plant of 1,000 MT/year is built as follow-on to the KAPF
by 2040, this facility would have to deal with a large backlog
of SNF. We demonstrate this in figure 9. 
In Figure 9 we plot total SNF in ROK under status quo
and pyroprocessing scenarios. We optimistically assume
a successful on-time completion of the Korea Advanced
Pyroprocessing Facility (KAPF) by 2028, which mitigates
100 MT/year of SNF, assuming, again, that all the requisite
approvals from the U.S. side were obtained, and in a timely
manner. This will be followed by a commercial-sized facil-
ity processing 1,000 MT/year beginning in 2038, should
all technical, licensing and economic issues be successfully
resolved. Between 2028 and 2038 the accumulation of SNF
surpasses pyroprocessing capacity. After 2038 pyropro-
cessing of SNF, should it be successfully implemented,
approximately matches the annual rate of production of
new SNF until a significant number of PWRs reach their
end of life and are decommissioned and SNF can be pro-
cessed faster than it is produced. However by that time a
significant backlog of untreated SNF will have accumulated,
which will require additional years to process. 
We see in Figure 10 the total space for SNF storage in
ROK projected to 2080. We see that even under optimistic
assumptions, there will be a dearth of SNF storage in Korea
around 2029 and additional SNF storage will be required
to continue operating then existing NPPs. The size of accu-
mulated SNF stockpile for which there might not be on-
Fig. 8.  Nominal Timelines for the Commercialization of Pyroprocessing, Fabrication and Fast Reactor Technologies in the ROK (13).
site storage available either in wet and possibly in dry cast
form is shown in Figure 10. 
As seen in figure 10, the maximum accumulation of
SNF requiring additional storage capacity in dry casks will
reaches about 10,000 MT. This is equivalent to about ten-
years-worth of SNF discharge from all operating PWRs by
about 2030. This would therefore be the ultimate size of
the required ROK ISFSI. Given less optimistic assumptions
regarding the start-up of KAPF and the follow-on commer-
cial-sized pyroprocessing plants, additional dry cask storage
capacity will be required, as implied by the ROK's assump-
tion of an ultimate centralized storage capacity reaching
possibly 20,000 MT (14). The ISFSI could, however, be
built in modular fashion reaching its maximum size by about
2050, corresponding to Figure 10. In order to ultimately
reach such capacity in forty years, it is still be required to
build a demonstration facility in the next ten years, as previ-
ously discussed. 
Such a SNF centralized dry cask storage demonstration
program would only expand the SNF disposal alternatives
available to the ROK, without committing it to one particular
course of action. In fact, we view such demonstration pro-
gram as enhancing the ROK’s options and flexibility, so
a more informed disposal choice could be made in the future.
Should such a program succeed, it would open the door for
a commercial-sized ISFSI facility, until the commercial-
sized pyroprocessing plant is constructed. If pyroprocessing
is successful, then centralized SNF storage demonstration
program would not hinder its commercialization and would
still be utilized. Should pyroprocessing ultimately be slow
in commercializing, or rejected, the storage demonstration
facility could serve as a stepping stone to a larger, full-
sized, ISFSI which will then be essential.
In the above discussion we reviewed issues related to
successful implementation of a pyroprocessing program in
the ROK and the concurrency requirement for commer-
cializing the dry cask storage, the pyroprocessing and the
breeder reactor technologies. We turn now to a discussion
of prospective Sodium Fast Reactor programs in the ROK
5. POTENTIAL ROK DEVELOPMENT OF SODIUM
FAST REACTOR SYSTEMS
Another potential area of cooperation in between the
ROK and the U.S. could involve advanced Generation IV
reactors, particularly Sodium Fast Reactors (SFR). In the
past, scientists at the KAERI research institute have worked
on a 600 MWe fast breeder reactor (FBR) design called
KALIMER (15), assuming this reactor would be fueled
by fissile material provided by pyroprocessing. Recently
the ROK scientists have scaled down their SFR development
plans and a more advanced version of a SFR is now planned
as a 150 MWe reactor, slated for initial operation by 2028,
as shown in Figure 8, assuming all technical and licensing
issues are resolved in timely manner. The development
of fast reactor designs and related fuel cycle facilities in
the ROK is a relatively new phenomenon carried out over
the past twenty years. Currently there is only one high-
temperature sodium loop in KAERI meant for thermo-
hydraulic studies. It is not clear that the ROK could transi-
tion from the current sodium test loop to a 150 MWe opera-
ting SFR by 2028. A smaller pilot plant might have to be
constructed to acquaint engineers with operational issues
of sodium-cooled reactors. We are thus concerned that a
commitment to an operating 150 MWe by 2028 might
prove difficult, given the limited current ROK technology
and operational base.
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Fig. 9. Impact of Commercial Scale Pyroprocessing Plant on
ROK SNF Accumulation; Pyroprocessing Plant of 100 MT/year
Operational in 2028 and 1,000 MT/year Facility by 2038.
Fig. 10. Total SNF Storage Space Available under an
Optimistic Pyroprocessing Scenario. Until 2029, New NPPs’
SNF Pool Capacity is used, in 2028 a Demonstration 100
MT/yr Pyroprocessing Facility is in Operation, in 2038 a
Commercial 1,000 MT/yr Pyroprocessing Facility Comes
Online. Despite These Optimistic Assumptions, all Storage is
Saturated (SNF Space Available < 0 MT) by 2030 and
Additional SNF Storage of ≈ 10 kMT is Required.
In contrast, the U.S. has extensive experience in FBR
plant design, construction, and fuel supply experience
extending over the past sixty years. In fact, the first nuclear
electricity generated in the U.S. came from an early proto-
type breeder – the Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR I)
in Idaho Falls in 1951. SFR development in the U.S. wit-
nessed many changes over the years. Currently, there are
two branches of SFR development pursued in the U.S. in
which ROK scientists have expressed interest. First, the
Super Prism FBR developed over the past thirty years by
General Electric Corporation (GE) (16),  second the newer
Traveling Wave Reactor (TWR) developed by Terra Power
Corporation (17).  As mentioned, it is important to have an
operating SFR ready when the first pyroprocessing plants
start generating significant quantities of metallic U-Pu-Zr
fuel. Since this fuel represents a higher proliferation danger
than spent PWR fuel, it is preferable to load it into an oper-
ating SFR as soon as practical, rather than keep it safe-
guarded until a reactor becomes available. 
Of the two SFR designs developed in the U.S. the Super
Prism is an advanced 300 MWe reactor, currently being
considered by the U.K. Government for plutonium elimina-
tion (18) mission. The Super Prism will operate without its
radial blankets in a burner mode. It will employ an external
fuel cycle, including fuel reprocessing and re-fabrication
plants, and will require a new fuel load every year, as well
as reprocessing of the discharged SNF to extract unburned
plutonium for further recycling. The PRISM design has been
extensively developed by GE over the past three decades,
and preliminarily reviewed by the U.S. NRC. Also, there
has been significant development of operations and safety
systems. A schematic design of the Super Prism is shown
in Figure 11.
In parallel, the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL) has developed its own SFR burner reactor design,
in part, in response to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP) program. Compared with the GE Super Prism
design the ANL burner reactor concept is still in a prelimi-
nary design stage and will require additional development
effort before it approaches the level of readiness of the Super
Prism design. Thus, further discussion will concentrate
on the GE SFR design.  
A newer traveling wave reactor (TWR) design is being
developed by Terra Power Corporation and supported by
venture capitalists affiliated with alumni of the Microsoft
Corporation, headed by Bill Gates. TWR development
represents a new and unique situation where a nuclear reac-
tor design program is supported by financial corporations
independently of the U.S. Government.  Terra Power has
utilized the most modern nuclear design tools available,
employed some of the best reactor designers in the U.S. and
has made great strides in reactor modeling over the last
seven years. The TWR design does not require an external
fuel cycle and can operate for many years on the original
fissile fuel load. It will still require some form of simplified
pyroprocessing to convert spent PWRs fuel to a form suita-
ble for the TWR. In particular, the TWR will require greater
fabrication effort than a conventional SFR since TWR fuel
will remain in the reactor for extended periods. The fuel
will reach very high burnup levels and burn the original
fissile content, converting fertile uranium within the fuel
element into fissile plutonium, which it will then also burn
in-situ. The TWR will thus requires special high strength
steels for fuel cladding and the testing of a lead fuel rod
and fuel assembly (LTA) before there can be confidence
in the design. Bill Gates recently presented the TWR to the
new Park Administration in the ROK (19). This reactor
requires a major fuel fabrication development program.
We assume such a program is well within the technical
capabilities of the ROK. Some versions of the TWR could,
in fact, use cleaned-up PWRs SNF as a fuel material, based
on earlier reprocessing schemes developed in the ROK, so
as to support the elimination of both SNF and fissile and
fertile contents (20). A schematic description of a 1,000
MWe (Plus) TWR is shown in Figure 12. 
When considering the two SFR options developed in
the U.S., especially in the context of possible collaboration
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Fig. 11. Design Concept of the GE Corporation’s Super Prism
Reactor Fig. 12. General Layout of a 1,150 MWe TWR Reactor Design
with the ROK, we find an interesting symmetry. There
exists the GE Super Prism reactor with advanced reactor
design but with extensive external fuel cycle requirements.
On the other hand the TWR reactor program lags the more
mature Super Prism reactor design, but its external fuel
cycle requirements are much simpler. In fact, once fuel is
loaded into the TWR, there is no external fuel cycle. The
fuel remains inside the reactor until a significant fraction
of all fissile and fertile content is consumed. The spent fuel
discharged from the TWR will include a smaller fissile or
fertile content and a significantly greater fraction of fission
products. Discharged TWR spent fuel will have to be dis-
posed of as waste in the then existing spent fuel management
system.
We believe it makes sense for a potential reactor-fuel
cycle collaboration to be jointly developed by the ROK and
the U.S. The U.S. could take care of the reactor devel-
opment, and the ROK could do more research on the fuel
cycle. To assure success, the ROK might wish to choose
the reactor that will minimize the fuel cycle development
requirements on its part. We stress here that the potential
joint program, discussed below, represent our own personal
suggestion and does not represent the official position of
the U.S. Government.
6. POTENTIAL JOINT ROK – U.S. SFR REACTOR
AND FUEL CYCLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
As mentioned above, the U.S. has developed an exten-
sive SFR program, relying on past experience. The ROK
however, with its pyroprocessing program, the earlier
DUPIC program (21),  the PRIDE facility (Figure 7) and
the related fuel re-fabrication program (see Figure 8) has
carried the SFR fuel development effort forward much
further than the U.S. Since all SFRs require a joint devel-
opment of both reactor and fuel cycle, the above situation
presents an opportunity for a joint reactor-fuel cycle devel-
opment effort between the ROK and the U.S. We suggest
a joint ROK - U.S. development program funded by both
parties. U.S. industry will be responsible for further devel-
opment of the SFR (With ROK financial and engineering
support). Limited financial support is available from the
U.K. and from venture capital corporations now, and further
U.S. private as well as Governmental support might become
available within about four years, depending on political
developments in the U.S. This is well within the remaining
time period for the ROK – U.S. initial pyroprocessing studies.
In parallel, the ROK will be principally responsible for
developing the fuel for the reactor design chosen as well
as the design of facilities required. Such a joint program
calls for reliance on the strengths of the two programs –
the U.S. in reactor design by industry teams, and the ROK
in fuel development by Government organizations. The end
product of such potential joint effort could be a package
of reactor and fuel cycle facilities, which will take in spent
PWR fuel, re-constitute it, and be ready to burn it in an SFR.
This will eliminate the PWR SNF’s fissile content, generat-
ing more electricity, and reducing the ultimate amount of
nuclear waste going to a final repository. Advanced versions
of such reactor-fuel cycle system could operate in the breeder
rather than burner mode as required in the future. 
A major concern of all such concepts is the need for
fuel reprocessing and for the recycling of plutonium in the
new fuel. Given the U.S. refusal to condone ENR facilities
in countries that do not already have such capabilities, how
could the U.S. support such programs in the ROK? Previ-
ously, it was claimed that pyroprocessing is different than
'conventional' PUREX reprocessing. The U.S. however
views pyroprocessing as reprocessing and therefore objects
to it on nonproliferation grounds (22). 
A different perspective on the role of pyroprocessing
could, however, be based on recognizing the fact that the
U.S. Government has permitted the transfer of pyropro-
cessing technology to the ROK. It should come as no sur-
prise that ROK scientists have considerably advanced the
state of the art of pyroprocessing technology. The financial
support by U.S. venture capital corporations independent
of U.S. Government funding represents a new phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the development and commercialization
program could still be controlled under a joint program.
Early studies with the PRIDE facility will extend till 2020.
Then, development of the KAPF facility will require an
additional five to ten years. With additional time for con-
struction, this may take until at least 2030. A follow-on
commercial pyroprocessing plant will require another five
to ten years, reaching maturity by about 2040, assuming
no technical or political “show-stoppers” along the way.
Real decisions about the path to take are about fifteen to
twenty five years away. It may be possible to design a 123
Agreement with off-ramps mirroring this development
process. This could represent a step-wise conditional deci-
sion process, wherein each step depends on successful
completion of the previous steps and fulfillment of a set
of pre-determined criteria. Such conditional requirements
could be incorporated into the language of a revised 123
Agreement. This could be negotiated in the next two years
if the right framework could be agreed-upon. The U.S.
knows the pitfalls of a reactor development process and
the large effort and time required for licensing reviews and
approvals. A long commercialization process still awaits
even well-developed SFR and fuel cycle programs such as
the Super Prism the TWR, and their associated fuel cycle
facilities. Further reactor design work could proceed in the
next four years in the U.S. and the ROK based on a mix of
venture capital and ROK funding while the joint pyropro-
cessing studies are continuing. Yet, with a potential ROK-
U.S. joint program, the chances of success are greatly en-
hanced. In the meantime, useful collaboration on a reactor-
fuel supply package could be accomplished under a carefully
crafted 123 Agreement under the right political umbrella,
without irretrievably forcing the commercialization barrier.
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7. SUMMARY
We have reviewed many SNF management and disposi-
tion options available to the ROK. We showed that under
most circumstances the ROK will require a dry cask ISFSI
facility to be commercialized in the late 2020’s. We have
also modeled and defined the ultimate size of such facility.
An ISFSI facility is modular in nature, and can be easily
expanded as the need arises. However, an early demon-
stration program is required soon if a larger scale facility
is to meet scheduler and operational requirements. We thus
proposed a potential joint ROK – U.S. away-from-reactors
dry cask demonstration program. Such demonstration pro-
gram is relatively easy to implement and has many benefits.
The ground-rules for consensus based siting of spent fuel
storage facilities and for enhancing public acceptance of
nuclear waste management programs were laid out in the
U.S. BRC report and are equally applicable in the ROK
and in the U.S. 
Realizing the ROK is mostly interested in pyropro-
cessing SNF we have argued that pyroprocessing and cen-
tralized dry storage are not mutually exclusive but comple-
mentary under ROK nuclear energy system conditions. With
any realistic schedule of pyroprocessing development,
centralized dry storage will still be required and will reduce
pressure to accelerate the commercializing of pyropro-
cessing on a large scale before the technology matures.
Since the ROK will likely require centralized storage, it
could develop this approach with U.S. support. A success-
fully demonstrated centralized dry cask storage program
would also have positive impacts on the U.S. spent fuel
management program, and on the ROK international nuclear
sales. This will further cement ROK - U.S. global nuclear
energy cooperation. 
Finally, we address the issue of fast reactors and their
fuel in the ROK. We discussed that Pyroprocessing is an
enabling technology for SNF management and not an end-
point; there is little point in developing pyroprocessing
without a complementary SFR program. Since historically
the U.S. is advanced in SFR reactor technology while the
ROK has accumulated experience in developing SFR fuel
supply systems, there is an opportunity in a complementary
and synergistic program combining both efforts. We envi-
sion a joint U.S. – ROK potential program to develop a
package SFR reactor and its associated fuel cycle. Both
efforts will require between ten and twenty five years to
develop, and could start on a relatively limited scale until
political support improves and additional funding is ob-
tained. We should stress here that this represent our personal
suggestion and not the official position of the U.S. Govern-
ment. It would be possible to begin such a program now
while making final implementation decisions in conditional
format later. This process could be defined in a carefully
crafted step-wise permitting process incorporated in a
revised 123 Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation between
the ROK and the U.S. 
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